Callwood v. Enos by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-13-2000 
Callwood v. Enos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Callwood v. Enos" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 217. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/217 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed October 13, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









JERRY ENOS*, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTION; 
CHESLEY ROEBUCK, CHAIRMAN OF V.I. 
PAROLE BOARD 
 
*Caption Amended -- See Clerk's Order of 11/19/99 
 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-00167) 
District Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch, Chief Judge 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 14, 2000 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit  Judges 
 




       James Callwood 
 
        Appellant Pro Se 
 
       Iver A. Stridiron 
       Frederick Handleman 
       Robert W. Bornholt 
       Office of Attorney General 
        of Virgin Islands 
       Department of Justice 
       Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, 
        U.S. V.I. 00802 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case, along with two others recently presented to the 
court, raises important issues concerning the jurisdiction of 
the courts in the Virgin Islands over habeas corpus 
petitions. Here, James Callwood appeals the order of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands denying his pro se 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he challenges 
the failure of the Virgin Islands Director of Corrections to 
recommend him to the Virgin Islands Board of Parole for an 







At approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 21, 1983, 
Callwood and his accomplice, Irvin Smith, broke into the 
home of John Bruggeman. Callwood was armed with a 
sawed-off shotgun and Smith with a machete. Bruggeman 
was asleep in the bedroom, and when he woke up and 
reached for the table, Callwood shot and killed him. 1 On 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The underlying facts of the crime are taken from the transcript of 
Callwood's plea hearing and therefore reflect the facts as admitted by 
Callwood at the time of his plea. Although Callwood was a juvenile (16) 
at the time of his arrest, he was transferred on August 26, 1983 to adult 
status pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, S 176. 
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September 28, 1983, Callwood pled guilty in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands to second degree murder in 
violation of territorial law, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 922. He 
was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. In 1984, he was 
sentenced to an additional 5 years for an earlier escape 
from custody. Since 1984, Callwood has been serving his 
sentence as a contractual-boarder in the United States 
federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and more 
recently in Edgefield, South Carolina.2  
 
Callwood filed a petition in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 in 1984 and 
again in 1989 in which he challenged the imposition of his 
sentence, seeking an order setting aside the sentence. He 
also filed a motion seeking to amend his S 2255 petitions. 
The two petitions, as well as the proposed amended 
petition, were denied on the merits by the District Court. 
We affirmed the denial on appeal by memorandum opinion 
dated January 2, 1991. 
 
On November 6, 1997, Callwood filed the pro se petition 
that is the subject of this appeal. In this petition, he alleges 
that he is in custody in violation of his rights under a 
Virgin Islands statute and the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution, made applicable to the Virgin 
Islands by 48 U.S.C. S 1561, because the Virgin Islands 
Bureau of Corrections has failed to recommend him for 
early parole eligibility under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 4601. 
That section of the Virgin Islands Code provides: 
 
       Except for a prisoner sentenced to a term of life 
       imprisonment without parole, every prisoner confined 
       in any penitentiary, jail or prison for a violation of the 
       Virgin Islands law for a definite term or terms of over 
       180 days or for the term of his natural life, whose 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Attorney General of the Virgin Islands is authorized by local 
statute to enter into agreements to use the correctional or detention 
facilities of the United States Bureau of Prisons when the Attorney 
General determines that "detention and/or correctional facilities within 
the Virgin Islands are inadequate to serve the best interest of the inmate 
or the general interest or welfare of the Territory," provided that 
certain 
education and/or vocational program requirements are met. See V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 5, S 4503(c). 
 
                                3 
  
       record of conduct shows that he has observed the rules 
       of the institution in which he is confined, upon 
       recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of 
       Corrections supported by the recommendation of a 
       psychiatrist and/or psychologist, may be released on 
       parole after serving one-half of such term or terms or 
       after serving 15 years of a life sentence or of a sentence 
       of 30 years or more or after serving the minimum 
       sentence required by law, whichever is greater; 
       Provided, however, That the Board of Parole, in its 
       discretion by at least a two-thirds affirmative vote of all 
       its members, upon recommendation by the Directors of 
       the Bureau of Corrections, supported by the 
       recommendation of a psychiatrist and/or psychologist, 
       is authorized to fix an earlier eligibility date for the 
       release of a prisoner on parole after serving one-third of 
       his term or terms or after serving 10 years of a life 
       sentence or of a sentence of 30 years or more . 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 4601 (emphasis added). 
 
Callwood has served over 10 years of his 45-year 
sentence, and, as we construe his petition, he now seeks a 
recommendation by the Directors of the Bureau of 
Corrections to the Board of Parole so that the Board of 
Parole can exercise its discretion in fixing a date for his 
release on parole. 
 
By letter dated June 23, 1997, the warden at the 
Lewisburg penitentiary, where Callwood was housed at the 
time he filed his petition, informed the Virgin Islands 
Bureau of Corrections of Callwood's desire for parole 
consideration. In the letter, the warden stated that 
Callwood has completed 10 years of his sentence and that 
"[a] psychological evaluation completed on May 2, 1997, 
indicates Inmate Callwood is an individual capable of 
maintaining responsible and regulation abiding behavior." 
The letter was accompanied by Callwood's Progress Report, 
issued by the United States Department of Justice, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. By letter dated July 8, 1997, another 
warden of the Lewisburg penitentiary informed the Virgin 
Islands Board of Parole of the same. Callwood has heard no 
response from either the Virgin Islands Directors of 
Corrections or Board of Parole. In his petition, Callwood 
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requests that the court "[o]rder that the Bureau of 
Correction fix an earlier parole eligibility date under 5 V.I.C. 
4601, thereby ordering the V.I. Parole Board to grant 
[Callwood] a hearing to consider his release on parole." Pet. 
filed Nov. 6, 1997, at 10. 
 
The District Court transferred the petition to this court to 
be treated as an application to file a second or successive 
petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244 
(requiring an order of the court of appeals authorizing the 
district court to consider a second or successive petition 
under S 2255). On March 31, 1998, we issued an order 
stating the following: 
 
       The foregoing application to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 
       S 2255 motion is denied as unnecessary. Because 
       petitioner wishes to challenge parole processes, he 
       must proceed under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, SS 1301- 
       1325. Bennett v. Soto, 850 F.2d 161, 163 (3d Cir. 
       1988). The clerk is directed to transfer the petition to 
       the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The district 
       court shall hear the petition in accordance with V.I. 
       Code Ann. tit. 5, SS 1301-1325. 
 
By order dated May 19, 1998, the District Court denied 








We begin our discussion with an inquiry into the 
jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands over 
Callwood's petition, an inquiry that is also relevant to our 
own jurisdiction over the appeal. 
 
Article IV, S 3 of the United States Constitution 
authorizes Congress to establish "all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States," including the Virgin 
Islands. U.S. Const. art. IV, S 3, cl.2; see also Brow v. 
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Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). Pursuant to 
that authority, Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act of 
1954, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645, which serves as the 
Constitution of the Virgin Islands and establishes the 
jurisdiction of its courts.3 The Revised Organic Act 
originally vested the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
with the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United 
States "in all causes arising under the Constitution, treaties 
and laws of the United States . . . ." Act of July 22, 1954, 
ch. 558, S 22, 68 Stat. 497. The Act also vested the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands with general original jurisdiction 
over all other matters in the Virgin Islands, subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the local courts over civil actions in 
which the amount in controversy was less than $500 and 
over criminal actions for local offenses in which the 
maximum punishment did not exceed six months in prison 
or a $100 fine. Under this jurisdictional framework, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands heard the majority of 
cases brought in the Virgin Islands, whether those cases 
were brought under federal law or local law, civil law or 
criminal law. See Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 679 F.2d 
1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining jurisdiction of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands under the Revised 
Organic Act of 1954 as "more like a state court of general 
jurisdiction than a United States district court"). 
 
In 1984, Congress rewrote the jurisdictional provisions of 
the Revised Organic Act, which set in motion a 
restructuring of the Virgin Islands judicial system. As we 
explain in today's decision in Walker v. Government of the 
Virgin Islands, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. Oct. ___, 2000), in 
enacting the 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic Act, 
Congress "affirmatively bestow[ed] on the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands the entire jurisdiction of a District Court 
of the United States . . . ." Id. at ___; see 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612(a). Moreover, in enacting the 1984 amendments, 
Congress gave the Virgin Islands legislature the power to 
vest jurisdiction over local actions exclusively in the local 
courts. See 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b); 48 U.S.C. S 1611(b); Estate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For a detailed account of the judicial system in effect in the Virgin 
Islands prior to the Revised Organic Act of 1954, see Carty v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1053-55 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of Virgin Islands, 923 
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1991) [caption of case amended 4/19/95]. 
 
On September 5, 1990, the Virgin Islands legislature 
exercised that power, enacting legislation, effective October 
1, 1991, that vests original jurisdiction over all local civil 
actions in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. See 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, S 76(a). Since October 1, 1991, 
therefore, all civil actions that are based on local law and 
that do not satisfy diversity jurisdiction requirements must 
be brought in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, 
with a few exceptions. See 48 U.S.C. S 1612; Brow, 994 
F.2d at 1034 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining the effect of V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 4, S 76(a) on the jurisdiction of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands over civil actions). 
 
Effective January 1, 1994, the Virgin Islands legislature 
also vested original jurisdiction in the Territorial Court over 
all local criminal actions. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, 
S 76(b)(1) & (c). However, under S 22 of the Revised Organic 
Act, the District Court of the Virgin Islands retains 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Territorial Court over 
criminal actions in which the local crimes charged are 
related to federal crimes. See 48 U.S.C.S 1612(c); United 
States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 75 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 
jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands under 
48 U.S.C. S 1612 and 4 V.I.C. S 32 over prosecution of 
defendant for both federal and territorial crimes). Thus, as 
a general matter, since January 1, 1994, the Territorial 
Court has had jurisdiction over criminal actions that are 
based solely on violations of local law, subject to the limited 
concurrent jurisdiction of the District Court. 
 
Pursuant to the system in place in 1983, Callwood's 
criminal proceedings, including the taking of his guilty plea 
and sentencing, took place in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. His conviction, however, is for violation of 
territorial criminal law, and the Virgin Islands is 
responsible for execution of his 45-year sentence, including 
his eligibility for parole. Had Callwood been prosecuted 
after January 1, 1994, in all likelihood his criminal 
proceedings would have taken place in the Territorial Court 
rather than the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
 
                                7 
  
With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to the 
jurisdictional issue presented in this case: whether the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction over 
Callwood's habeas petition challenging the execution of his 
sentence, i.e. his eligibility for parole. We hold that it does, 
but not on the basis to which we referred in our March 31, 




Given the significant jurisdictional changes instituted by 
the 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic Act and 
subsequent Virgin Islands legislation, we revisit the 
statement in our March 31, 1998 order that "[t]he district 
court shall hear [Callwood's writ of habeas corpus] petition 
[challenging his parole status] in accordance with V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 5, SS 1301-1325." As we have been directed, "An 
appellate federal court must satisfy itself not only of its own 
jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause 
under review." Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action."). 
 
Sections 1301-1325, tit. 5, of the Virgin Islands Code 
provide for the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. In 
particular, S 1303 states that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus 
may be granted by the district court, upon petition by or on 
behalf of any person restrained of his liberty." V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 5, S 1303. 
 
In stating in the March 31, 1998 order that the District 
Court had jurisdiction over Callwood's petition under the 
territorial habeas corpus provisions, we relied on our 
holding in Bennett v. Soto, 850 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1988), 
that a prisoner's challenge to his parole status was properly 
brought under SS 1301-1325 in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. Although the district court in Bennett did 
have jurisdiction over Bennett's petition underS 1303, 
because of subsequent statutory changes the District Court 
in this case does not have jurisdiction under that section 
over Callwood's petition. Bennett's petition wasfiled before 
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October 1, 1991, the effective date of the territorial statute 
that vested jurisdiction over local civil actions in the 
Territorial Court. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, S 76(a). 
Callwood's petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 
1997, after the effective date of S 76(a). 
 
A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although 
admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in 
nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Accordingly, by operation of S 76(a), as of 
October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was 
divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We 
have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands 
Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they 
have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. 
v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (holding that V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5,S 76(a) 
implicitly repealed a writ-of-review provision that provided 
for jurisdiction in the District Court); Moravian Sch. 
Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, V.I. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 
273 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). It follows that to the extent that 
S 1303 vests jurisdiction in the District Court over a habeas 
corpus action brought under that section, it too has been 
repealed. 
 
The issue whether, under these circumstances, S 1303 
should be interpreted to provide for jurisdiction in the 
Territorial Court in lieu of the District Court is not before 
us in this case.4 We hold only that the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands does not have jurisdiction underS 1303 over 
petitions filed under that section after October 1, 1991, and 
thus that that section does not confer jurisdiction on the 




The fact that the District Court does not have jurisdiction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Parrott v. Government of the Virgin Islands, ____ F.3d ____ (3d Cir. 
Oct. ___, 2000), filed herewith, this court holds that S 1303 is to be 
construed to provide the Territorial Court with jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions. 
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under the local statute does not end our jurisdictional 
inquiry. Rather, we must also consider whether the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2241, the federal habeas statute under which a 
prisoner may challenge parole proceedings. See United 
States v. Ferri, 686 F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 
Bennett, 850 F.2d at 162-63 ("The jurisdictional authority 
of 28 U.S.C. S 2255 is limited to challenges to the legality of 
a sentence and does not encompass the power to entertain 
a claim for wrongful revocation of parole."). 
 
Before the 1984 amendments, the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands lacked the authority to issue writs under 
S 2241 because the "district courts" that are authorized to 
entertain writs under that section are defined in Title 28 as 
"courts constituted by chapter 5 of [Title 28]." 28 U.S.C. 
S 451. The District Court of the Virgin Islands is not such 
a court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 81-131, and therefore we held in 
Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971, 974 (3d Cir. 1978), that it did 
not have authority to issue writs under S 2241.5 As we 
explain in detail in Walker, however, in enacting the 1984 
amendments to the Revised Organic Act, Congress gave the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands the authority to issue 
writs of habeas corpus even though it is not a "district 
court[ ]" within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States 
Code. Walker was convicted in the Territorial Court for 
territorial crimes. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
challenging the imposition of his conviction and sentence 
by the Territorial Court. In Walker, we state that S 22 of the 
Revised Organic Act, as amended, "affirmatively bestows on 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands the entire 
jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States . . . ." 
Walker, ___ F.3d at ___; see also  48 U.S.C. S 1612(a) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In contrast, since 1949 the District Court of the Virgin Islands has 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 over petitions brought by 
prisoners challenging the imposition of sentences by that court because 
S 2255 authorizes courts "established by Act of Congress" to issue relief 
under that section. See United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 
681, 682 n.1 (3d Cir. 1954). Nothing in the 1984 amendments affects the 
authority of the District Court of the Virgin Islands to issue relief 
under 
S 2255, where applicable. 
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(providing that the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
"shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United 
States"). After extensive examination of the 1984 
amendments, we conclude there that Congress intended for 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands to have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 "where the petitioner is in custody 
serving a sentence of the Territorial Court," Walker, ___ 
F.3d at ___, even though S 2254, likeS 2241, refers to 
"district courts." 
 
Applying the 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic 
Act to this case, we conclude that although the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands does not have jurisdiction over 
Callwood's petition under S 1303, the territorial habeas 
corpus provision, it does have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241.6 We have jurisdiction over Callwood's appeal from 
the District Court's final order denying the writ pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 and S 2253.7  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Callwood named Jerry Enos, the Director of the Virgin Islands Bureau 
of Corrections, and Chesley Roebuck, the Chairman of the Virgin Islands 
Parole Board, as respondents in his petition. At the time that he filed 
his 
petition, Callwood was imprisoned in a federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania, and he is now imprisoned in a federal penitentiary in 
Edgefield, South Carolina. Given the unusual circumstances of prisoners 
convicted in the Virgin Islands for territorial crimes who are now housed 
in federal prisons on a contract basis and who are challenging the 
execution of their sentence, the Director of the Virgin Islands Bureau of 
Corrections is the constructive custodian of such prisoners, and 
therefore is a proper respondent for Callwood'sS 2241 petition. See 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky , 410 U.S. 484 (1973); 
see also Order of Judgment and Commitment (committing Callwood to 
the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections). 
 
7. A certificate of appealability is not a prerequisite to an appeal by a 
prisoner convicted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands for 
territorial crimes who seeks an earlier parole date pursuant to S 2241. 
See 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1) (requiring a certificate of appealability in 
S 2255 proceedings and where the detention complained of arises out of 
"process issued by a State court"). Callwood, unlike Walker, who we hold 
was required to obtain a certificate of appealability under S 2253(c)(1), 
see Walker, ___ F.3d at ___, is not in custody pursuant to the sentence 
of the Territorial Court; rather, he is in custody pursuant to the 
sentence 
of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and challenges the execution 
of that sentence by the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. 
 
                                11 
  
Nonetheless, given our understanding of the judicial 
system as it now stands in the Virgin Islands, principles of 
comity mandate that Callwood be required to exhaust his 
remedies in the Territorial Court before proceeding in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands under federal law. 
Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement 
attached to S 2241, we have consistently applied an 
exhaustion requirement to claims brought under S 2241. 
See Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 
1986) ("The state court exhaustion requirement is 
mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b) and has 
developed through decisional law in applying principles of 
comity and federalism as to claims brought under 28 
U.S.C. S 2241."); Arias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 648 
F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring federal prisoner to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing claim 
under S 2241). As Callwood has understandably failed to 
seek relief in the Territorial Court under S 1303, this is a 
case particularly well-suited to dismissal at this stage for 
lack of exhaustion. The Territorial Court will no doubt be 
more familiar with the provisions and requirements of the 
territorial parole statute and should be given an 
opportunity to provide a remedy, if appropriate, before 
Callwood seeks federal habeas corpus relief. Callwood will 
be free to return to the District Court under S 2241, after 
exhausting any remedy available in the Territorial Court. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court 
dismissing the petition on the merits and will remand with 
instructions to dismiss for failure to exhaust local remedies 
without prejudice to Callwood's refiling his challenge under 
S 2241 after exhaustion.8 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although we express no view on the merits of the claims presented in 
Callwood's petition, we note that in order to attain relief under S 2241, 
Callwood must establish that he is being held in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241. 
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